Part 1: Purchasing Labour
With two little boys at home, I don’t get out much, so a visit to a new craft brewery in Niagara was an exciting event. Playing it safe, I opted to start with the IPA. It had a nice grapefruit and tangerine aroma that lead into hints of tropical fruit notes followed by a slightly over the top bitterness. There was more than enough potential in this first beer to convince me to purchase a variety of tall cans. In the process of the exchange, I got chatting with the owner who was excited about the growing craft beer movement in Ontario but was worried that the ambition of a few breweries had elevated their production levels beyond the “craft” status. Relaying this story to a friend, I was told that any beer was craft so long as it wasn’t owned by InBev — the corporation responsible for almost 50% of the beer produced in North America that had generated revenue of about 47.06 billion U.S. dollars worldwide in 2014. Bubbling under the surface of the Niagara craft brewer’s concern was, well, beer. He was concerned that the larger the operation, the more likely it was that the passion for beer is eclipsed by the motivation to make money.
In the last post, we learned that according to Marx the only way to generate original value is through labour, the trick that we have yet to discover is how a capitalist generates value using capital alone. This mystery, as we will discover, isn’t all that complicated: to generate value without imputing one’s own labour, the capitalist must exploit someone else’s labour-power. The trick is to find a way of accomplishing this feat without violating the rules of economic exchange.
This post was originally given as a prayer at Westview Christian Fellowship.
Lament over the Destruction of Jerusalem
- 1 By the rivers of Babylon—
- there we sat down and there we wept
- when we remembered Zion.
- 2 On the willows[a] there
- we hung up our harps.
- 3 For there our captors
- asked us for songs,
- and our tormentors asked for mirth, saying,
- “Sing us one of the songs of Zion!”
- 4 How could we sing the Lord’s song
- in a foreign land?
- 5 If I forget you, O Jerusalem,
- let my right hand wither!
- 6 Let my tongue cling to the roof of my mouth,
- if I do not remember you,
- if I do not set Jerusalem
- above my highest joy.
- 7 Remember, O Lord, against the Edomites
- the day of Jerusalem’s fall,
- how they said, “Tear it down! Tear it down!
- Down to its foundations!”
- 8 O daughter Babylon, you devastator![b]
- Happy shall they be who pay you back
- what you have done to us!
- 9 Happy shall they be who take your little ones
- and dash them against the rock!
It’s difficult to accept the fact that the Bible describes revenge in such brutal detail as found in Psalm 137. There are other Psalms that ask us to direct our anger in ways that promote peace rather than perpetuate violence but not Psalms 137. Psalm 137 doesn’t temper an author’s fierce anger towards injustice and desire for revenge. It’s important to hear and remember the extent of the anger expressed here because it was apocalyptic verses like these that inspire Christ. He too is angry at the injustice he sees around him and condemns Israel in a similar way as Jeremiah (the prophet we think authored Psalm 137) condemns Babylon.
Psalm 137 is remembered for its violence but also because of the haunting tune set to its lyrics by Don McLean titled “Babylon” linked at the beginning of this post. If we let them, the song and its lyrics can haunt us in three healthy ways.
This article originally appeared on Groundmotive.net
Ethan Vanderleek, a fellow junior member at ICS, contributes to the upcoming edition of Perspective an excellent article titled, “Some Truths about Christian Prayer.” Quoting Merold Westphal, Ethan writes, “Prayer is the posture of a decentered self.” I confess to knowing very little about prayer, for this reason I’ll focus my discussion on the second half of this quote—the nature of a decentered self.
To illustrate what one might mean by a “decentered self,” let’s follow Derrida by examining the nature of a confession: “I confess.” When an unrepentant criminal confesses, for example, identity changes, the “I” becomes a repentant “I.” But there is a problem here. Given these two separate identities, how are we to decide which one actually makes the confession? Is it the repentant or unrepentant “I?”
A closer look at the moment the unrepentant self repents reveals something very strange. An unrepentant criminal by definition does not confess. Who then authorizes or initiates the confession? If there has been no confession, then the repentant criminal does not exist, at least not as such, and therefore cannot initiate the confession. So the confessing “I” is neither the unrepentant criminal nor the repentant criminal. Derrida claims that a fabulous gap resides in this liminal moment of responsibility in which both identities are inexplicably present and absent. Whenever we assume responsibility, whenever we act, make a decision, or confess, we enter into this space, our past and future selves are simultaneously present and absent.
That which originally seemed very definitive—the “I,” the decision-making self—is in reality quite indefinite. Two possibilities emerge from this ambiguity.